Dynamics and Stability of Constitutions, Coalitions, and Clubs

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Acemoglu, Daron; Egorov, Georgy; Sonin, Konstantin
• 署名单位: Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT); Northwestern University; New Economic School
• 刊物名称: AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0002-8282
• DOI: 10.1257/aer.102.4.1446
• 发表日期: 2012
• 页码: 1446-1476
• 关键词: model

摘要

In dynamic collective decision making, current decisions determine the future distribution of political power and influence future decisions. We develop a general framework to study this class of problems. Under acyclicity, we characterize dynamically stable states as functions of the initial state and obtain two general insights. First, a social arrangement is made stable by the instability of alternative arrangements that are preferred by sufficiently powerful groups. Second, efficiency-enhancing changes may be resisted because of further changes they will engender. We use this framework to analyze dynamics of political rights in a society with different types of extremist views. (JEL D71, D72, K10)