The Cost of Contract Renegotiation: Evidence from the Local Public Sector

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Gagnepain, Philippe; Ivaldi, Marc; Martimort, David
• 署名单位: heSam Universite; Universite Pantheon-Sorbonne; Paris School of Economics; Universite de Toulouse; Universite Toulouse 1 Capitole; Toulouse School of Economics; Paris School of Economics
• 刊物名称: AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0002-8282
• DOI: 10.1257/aer.103.6.2352
• 发表日期: 2013
• 页码: 2352-2383
• 关键词: Asymmetric information; adverse selection; procurement; COMMITMENT; revelation; POLICY

摘要

Contract theory claims that renegotiation prevents attainment of the efficient solution that could be obtained under full commitment. Assessing the cost of renegotiation remains an open issue from an empirical viewpoint. We fit a structural principal-agent model with renegotiation on a set of contracts for urban transport services. The model captures two important features of the industry as only two types of contracts are used (fixed price and cost-plus) and subsidies are greater following a cost-plus contract than following a fixed-price one. We conclude that the welfare gains from improving commitment would be significant but would accrue mostly to operators.