Public Monopoly and Economic Efficiency: Evidence from the Pennsylvania Liquor Control Board's Entry Decisions

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Seim, Katja; Waldfogel, Joel
• 署名单位: University of Pennsylvania; University of Minnesota System; University of Minnesota Twin Cities
• 刊物名称: AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0002-8282
• DOI: 10.1257/aer.103.2.831
• 发表日期: 2013
• 页码: 831-862
• 关键词: oligopoly market; retail markets; wal-mart; COMPETITION; MODEL; consumption; OWNERSHIP; location; CHOICE; prices

摘要

We estimate a spatial model of liquor demand to analyze the impact of government-controlled retailing on entry patterns. In the absence of the Pennsylvania Liquor Control Board, the state would have roughly 2.5 times the current number of stores, higher consumer surplus, and lower payments to liquor store employees. With just over half the number of stores that would maximize welfare, the government system is instead best rationalized as profit maximization with profit sharing. Government operation mitigates, but does not eliminate, free entry's bias against rural consumers. We find only limited evidence of political influence on entry.