Bidding for Incomplete Contracts: An Empirical Analysis of Adaptation Costs

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Bajari, Patrick; Houghton, Stephanie; Tadelis, Steven
• 署名单位: University of Washington; University of Washington Seattle; National Bureau of Economic Research; University of Texas System; University of Texas Austin; University of California System; University of California Berkeley; eBay Inc.
• 刊物名称: AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0002-8282
• DOI: 10.1257/aer.104.4.1288
• 发表日期: 2014
• 页码: 1288-1319
• 关键词: procurement; COMPETITION; 1ST-PRICE; auctions; equilibrium; common; models

摘要

Procurement contracts are often renegotiated because of changes that are required after their execution. Using highway paving contracts we show that renegotiation imposes significant adaptation costs. Reduced form regressions suggest that bidders respond strategically to contractual incompleteness and that adaptation costs are an important determinant of their bids. A structural empirical model compares adaptation costs to bidder markups and shows that adaptation costs account for 7.5-14 percent of the winning bid. Markups from private information and market power, the focus of much of the auctions literature, are much smaller by comparison. Implications for government procurement are discussed.