Isolated Capital Cities, Accountability, and Corruption: Evidence from US States

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Campante, Filipe R.; Quoc-Anh Do
• 署名单位: Harvard University; National Bureau of Economic Research
• 刊物名称: AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0002-8282
• DOI: 10.1257/aer.104.8.2456
• 发表日期: 2014
• 页码: 2456-2481
• 关键词: POLITICAL-ECONOMY

摘要

We show that isolated capital cities are robustly associated with greater levels of corruption across US states, in line with the view that this isolation reduces accountability. We then provide direct evidence that the spatial distribution of population relative to the capital affects different accountability mechanisms: newspapers cover state politics more when readers are closer to the capital, voters who live far from the capital are less knowledgeable and interested in state politics, and they turn out less in state elections. We also find that isolated capitals are associated with more money in state-level campaigns, and worse public good provision.