Do Physicians' Financial Incentives Affect Medical Treatment and Patient Health?

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Clemens, Jeffrey; Gottlieb, Joshua D.
• 署名单位: University of California System; University of California San Diego; National Bureau of Economic Research; University of British Columbia
• 刊物名称: AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0002-8282
• DOI: 10.1257/aer.104.4.1320
• 发表日期: 2014
• 页码: 1320-1349
• 关键词: care; insurance; reimbursement; uncertainty; work

摘要

We investigate whether physicians' financial incentives influence health care supply, technology diffusion, and resulting patient outcomes. In 1997, Medicare consolidated the geographic regions across which it adjusts physician payments, generating area-specific price shocks. Areas with higher payment shocks experience significant increases in health care supply. On average, a 2 percent increase in payment rates leads to a 3 percent increase in care provision. Elective procedures such as cataract surgery respond much more strongly than less discretionary services. Non-radiologists expand their provision of MRIs, suggesting effects on technology adoption. We estimate economically small health impacts, albeit with limited precision.