Efficient Entry in Competing Auctions

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Albrecht, James; Gautier, Pieter A.; Vroman, Susan
• 署名单位: Georgetown University; Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam
• 刊物名称: AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0002-8282
• DOI: 10.1257/aer.104.10.3288
• 发表日期: 2014
• 页码: 3288-3296
• 关键词: offer auctions; sellers; equilibrium; search; prices

摘要

In this paper, we demonstrate the efficiency of seller entry in a model of competing auctions in which we allow for both buyer and seller heterogeneity. This generalizes existing efficiency results in the competitive search literature by simultaneously allowing for nonrival (many-on-one) meetings and private information.