Time Allocation and Task Juggling

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Coviello, Decio; Ichino, Andrea; Persico, Nicola
• 署名单位: Universite de Montreal; HEC Montreal; University of Bologna; European University Institute; Northwestern University
• 刊物名称: AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0002-8282
• DOI: 10.1257/aer.104.2.609
• 发表日期: 2014
• 页码: 609-623
• 关键词: TOWER

摘要

A single worker allocates her time among different projects which are progressively assigned. When the worker works on too many projects at the same time, the output rate decreases and completion time increases according to a law which we derive. We call this phenomenon task juggling and argue that it is pervasive in the workplace. We show that task juggling is a strategic substitute of worker effort. We then present a model where task juggling is the result of lobbying by clients, or coworkers, each seeking to get the worker to apply effort to his project ahead of the others'.(JEL J22, M12, M54)