The Dynamic Efficiency Costs of Common-Pool Resource Exploitation

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Huang, Ling; Smith, Martin D.
• 署名单位: University of Connecticut; Duke University; Duke University
• 刊物名称: AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0002-8282
• DOI: 10.1257/aer.104.12.4071
• 发表日期: 2014
• 页码: 4071-4103
• 关键词: OPEN-ACCESS FISHERY; capacity utilization; property resource; discrete-choice; models; management; RIGHTS; ECONOMICS; deforestation; preferences

摘要

We conduct the first empirical investigation of common-pool resource users' dynamic and strategic behavior at the micro level using -real-world data. Fishermen's strategies in a fully dynamic game account for latent resource dynamics and other players' actions, revealing the profit structure of the fishery. We compare the fishermen's actual and socially optimal exploitation paths under a time-specific vessel allocation policy and find a sizable dynamic externality. Individual fishermen respond to other users by exerting effort above the optimal level early in the season. Congestion is costly instantaneously but is beneficial in the long run because it partially offsets dynamic inefficiencies.