Social Ideology and Taxes in a Differentiated Candidates Framework

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Krasa, Stefan; Polborn, Mattias
• 署名单位: University of Illinois System; University of Illinois Urbana-Champaign; University of Illinois System; University of Illinois Urbana-Champaign
• 刊物名称: AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0002-8282
• DOI: 10.1257/aer.104.1.308
• 发表日期: 2014
• 页码: 308-322
• 关键词: model; redistribution; polarization; COMPETITION

摘要

Many observers argue that political polarization, particularly on social and cultural issues, has increased in the United States. How does this influence the political competition on economic issues? We analyze this question using a framework in which two-office-motivated candidates differ in their fixed ideological position and choose a level of government spending to maximize their vote share. In equilibrium, candidates cater to a set of swing voters who contain socially conservative and economically-liberal voters, as well as socially-liberal and economically-conservative voters. We analyze how voters' cultural preferences and candidates' cultural positions influence equilibrium economic positions.