Raising Retailers' Profits: On Vertical Practices and the Exclusion of Rivals

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Asker, John; Bar-Isaac, Heski
• 署名单位: University of Toronto
• 刊物名称: AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0002-8282
• DOI: 10.1257/aer.104.2.672
• 发表日期: 2014
• 页码: 672-686
• 关键词: resale price maintenance; Demand uncertainty; restraints; entry; POWER

摘要

Resale price maintenance (RPM), slotting fees, loyalty rebates, and other related vertical practices can allow an incumbent manufacturer to transfer profits to retailers. If these retailers were to accommodate entry, upstream competition could lead to lower industry profits and the breakdown of these profit transfers. Thus, in equilibrium, retailers can internalize the effect of accommodating entry on the incumbent's profits. Consequently, if entry requires downstream accommodation, entry can be deterred. We discuss policy implications of this aspect of vertical contracting practices. (JEL L14, L22, L25, L42, L81)