How Financial Incentives Induce Disability Insurance Recipients to Return to Work

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Kostol, Andreas Ravndal; Mogstad, Magne
• 署名单位: Statistics Norway; University of Bergen; University of London; University College London; Statistics Norway
• 刊物名称: AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0002-8282
• DOI: 10.1257/aer.104.2.624
• 发表日期: 2014
• 页码: 624-655
• 关键词: applicants; earnings; HEALTH; program; rolls; SSDI

摘要

Using a local randomized experiment that arises from a sharp discontinuity in Disability Insurance (DI) policy in Norway, we provide transparent and credible identification of how financial incentives induce DI recipients to return to work. We find that many DI recipients have considerable capacity to work that can be effectively induced by providing financial work incentives. We further show that providing work incentives to DI recipients may both increase their disposable income and reduce program costs. Our findings also suggest that targeted policies may be the most effective in encouraging DI recipients to return to work. (JEL D14, H55, J14, J22, J28)