Partnerships versus Corporations: Moral Hazard, Sorting, and Ownership Structure

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Kaya, Aya; Vereshchagina, Galina
• 署名单位: University of Iowa; Arizona State University; Arizona State University-Tempe
• 刊物名称: AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0002-8282
• DOI: 10.1257/aer.104.1.291
• 发表日期: 2014
• 页码: 291-307
• 关键词: Incentives; RISK

摘要

Team production takes advantage of technological complementarities but comes with the cost of free-ridership. When workers differ in skills, the choice of sorting pattern may be associated with a nontrivial trade-off between exploiting the technological complementarities and minimizing the cost of free-ridership. This paper demonstrates that whether such a trade-off arises depends (i) on how the power of incentives required for effort provision varies with workers' types, and (ii) on whether the workers are organized for production in partnerships or in corporations. These results have implications for how production is organized in different industries-in partnerships or in corporations.