Consumption Risk-Sharing in Social Networks

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Ambrus, Attila; Mobius, Markus; Szeidl, Adam
• 署名单位: Duke University; Microsoft; University of Michigan System; University of Michigan; National Bureau of Economic Research; Central European University
• 刊物名称: AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0002-8282
• DOI: 10.1257/aer.104.1.149
• 发表日期: 2014
• 页码: 149-182
• 关键词: informal insurance; COOPERATION; COMMITMENT; TRADE

摘要

We develop a model in which connections between individuals serve as social collateral to enforce informal insurance payments. We show that: (i) The degree of insurance is governed by the expansiveness of the network, measured with the per capita number of connections that groups have with the rest of the community. Two-dimensional networks-like real-world networks in Peruvian villages-are sufficiently expansive to allow very good risk-sharing. (ii) In - second-best arrangements, insurance is local: agents fully share shocks within, but imperfectly between endogenously emerging risk-sharing groups. We also discuss how endogenous social collateral affects our results.