Aligned Delegation

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Frankel, Alexander
• 署名单位: University of Chicago
• 刊物名称: AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0002-8282
• DOI: 10.1257/aer.104.1.66
• 发表日期: 2014
• 页码: 66-83
• 关键词: CHEAP; COMMUNICATION; INFORMATION; settings

摘要

A principal delegates multiple decisions to an agent, who has private information relevant to each decision. The principal is uncertain about the agent's preferences. I solve for max-min optimal mechanisms those which maximize the principal's payoff against the worst case agent preference types. These mechanisms are characterized by a property I call aligned delegation: all agent types play identically, as if they shared the principal's preferences. Max-min optimal mechanisms may take the simple forms of ranking mechanisms, budgets, or sequential quotas.