Language, Meaning, and Games: A Model of Communication, Coordination, and Evolution: Comment

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Heller, Yuval
• 署名单位: University of Oxford
• 刊物名称: AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0002-8282
• DOI: 10.1257/aer.104.6.1857
• 发表日期: 2014
• 页码: 1857-1863
• 关键词: SELECTION DYNAMICS; local stability

摘要

Demichelis and Weibull (2008) show that adding lexicographic lying costs to coordination games with cheap talk yields a sharp prediction: only the efficient outcome is evolutionarily stable. I show that this result is caused by the discontinuity of preferences rather than by small lying costs per se. Finally, I discuss why discontinuity may not be an appealing assumption in evolutionary models.