Not Only What but Also When: A Theory of Dynamic Voluntary Disclosure

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Guttman, Ilan; Kremer, Ilan; Skrzypacz, Andrzej
• 署名单位: New York University; Hebrew University of Jerusalem; Hebrew University of Jerusalem; University of Warwick; Stanford University
• 刊物名称: AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0002-8282
• DOI: 10.1257/aer.104.8.2400
• 发表日期: 2014
• 页码: 2400-2420
• 关键词: INFORMATION ENDOWMENT; EARNINGS FORECASTS; management

摘要

We examine a dynamic model of voluntary disclosure of multiple pieces of private information. In our model, a manager of a firm who may learn multiple signals over time interacts with a competitive capital market and maximizes payoffs that increase in both period prices. We show (perhaps surprisingly) that in equilibrium later disclosures are interpreted more favorably even though the time the manager obtains the signals is independent of the value of the firm. We also provide sufficient conditions for the equilibrium to be in threshold strategies.