The Effect of Third-Party Funding of Plaintiffs on Settlement

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Daughety, Andrew F.; Reinganum, Jennifer F.
• 署名单位: Vanderbilt University
• 刊物名称: AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0002-8282
• DOI: 10.1257/aer.104.8.2552
• 发表日期: 2014
• 页码: 2552-2566
• 关键词: LITIGATION FINANCE; CONTRACTS; MARKET

摘要

A significant policy concern about the emerging plaintiff legal funding industry is that loans will undermine settlement. When the plaintiff has private information about damages, we find that the optimal (plaintiff-funder) loan induces all plaintiff types to make the same demand, resulting in full settlement; implementation may entail a very high repayment amount. Plaintiffs' attorneys with contingent-fee compensation benefit from such financing, as it eliminates trial costs. When the defendant has private information about his likelihood of being found liable, we find that the likelihood of settlement is unaffected. In both settings the defendant's incentive for care-taking is unaffected.