Fraudulent Claims and Nitpicky Insurers

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Bourgeon, Jean-Marc; Picard, Pierre
• 署名单位: INRAE; Institut Polytechnique de Paris; Ecole Polytechnique
• 刊物名称: AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0002-8282
• DOI: 10.1257/aer.104.9.2900
• 发表日期: 2014
• 页码: 2900-2917
• 关键词: insurance fraud; COMMITMENT; CONTRACTS; POLICY

摘要

Insurers have the reputation of being bad payers who nitpick whenever an opportunity arises. However, this nitpicking activity has a positive impact on their auditing strategy since auditing may prove profitable when claims are not fraudulent. We show that reducing the indemnity payments of audited claims induces a lower fraud rate at equilibrium and that some degree of nitpicking is socially optimal when insurance fraud is a concern. Its remains optimal even if it induces adverse effects on policyholders' moral standards.