The Continuous Combinatorial Auction Architecture

• 成果类型: Article; Proceedings Paper
• 署名作者: Plott, Charles. R.; Lee, Hsing-Yang; Maron, Travis
• 署名单位: California Institute of Technology
• 刊物名称: AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0002-8282
• DOI: 10.1257/aer.104.5.452
• 发表日期: 2014
• 页码: 452-456
• 关键词: allocation; mechanism

摘要

The paper reviews the prominent features of a continuous, combinatorial auction. A brief discussion of background material helps draw distinctions between auction architectures. Background definitions, rules, and operational features define the auction in Section II. Testing and performance are outlined in Section III.