An Empirical Model of the Medical Match

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Agarwal, Nikhil
• 署名单位: Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT); National Bureau of Economic Research
• 刊物名称: AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0002-8282
• DOI: 10.1257/aer.20131006
• 发表日期: 2015
• 页码: 1939-1978
• 关键词: market; identification; STABILITY; estimator; education; demand

摘要

This paper develops a framework for estimating preferences in a many-to-one matching market using only observed matches. I use pairwise stability and a vertical preference restriction on one side to identify preferences on both sides of the market. Counterfactual simulations are used to analyze the antitrust allegation that the centralized medical residency match is responsible for salary depression. Due to residents' willingness to pay for desirable programs and capacity constraints, salaries in any competitive equilibrium would remain, on average, at least $23,000 below the marginal product of labor. Therefore, the match is not the likely cause of low salaries. (JEL C78, I11, J31, J44, K21, L44)