Team Contests with Multiple Pairwise Battles

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Fu, Qiang; Lu, Jingfeng; Pan, Yue
• 署名单位: National University of Singapore; National University of Singapore; National University of Singapore
• 刊物名称: AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0002-8282
• DOI: 10.1257/aer.20121469
• 发表日期: 2015
• 页码: 2120-2140
• 关键词: rent-seeking contests; All-pay auctions; equilibrium; INFORMATION; tournaments; feedback

摘要

We consider a multi-battle team contest in which players from two rival teams form pairwise matches to fight in distinct component battles, which are carried out sequentially or (partially) simultaneously. A team wins if and only if its players win a majority of battles. Each player benefits from his team's win, while he can also receive a private reward for winning his own battle. We find that the outcomes of past battles do not distort the outcomes of future battles. Neither the total expected effort nor the overall outcome of the contest depends on the contest's temporal structure or its feedback policy. (JEL C72, D72, D74, D82)