Efficient Firm Dynamics in a Frictional Labor Market

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Kaas, Leo; Kircher, Philipp
• 署名单位: University of Konstanz; University of Edinburgh
• 刊物名称: AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0002-8282
• DOI: 10.1257/aer.20131702
• 发表日期: 2015
• 页码: 3030-3060
• 关键词: Directed search; competitive search; firing costs; job creation; unemployment; WORKER; VACANCIES; BEHAVIOR; models

摘要

We develop and analyze a labor market model in which heterogeneous firms operate under decreasing returns and compete for labor by posting long-term contracts. Firms achieve faster growth by offering higher lifetime wages, which allows them to fill vacancies with higher probability, consistent with recent empirical findings. The model also captures several other regularities about firm size, job flows, and pay, and generates sluggish aggregate dynamics of labor market variables. In contrast to existing bargaining models with large firms, efficiency obtains and the model allows a tractable characterization over the business cycle.