Technical Change, Wage Inequality, and Taxes

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Ales, Laurence; Kurnaz, Musab; Sleet, Christopher
• 署名单位: Carnegie Mellon University
• 刊物名称: AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0002-8282
• DOI: 10.1257/aer.20140466
• 发表日期: 2015
• 页码: 3061-3101
• 关键词: labor; polarization; earnings; elasticities; TECHNOLOGY; taxation; MARKET; skills; tasks; rise

摘要

This paper considers the normative implications of technical change for tax policy design. A task-to-talent assignment model of the labor market is embedded into an optimal tax problem. Technical change modifies equilibrium wage growth across talents and the substitutability of talents across tasks. The overall optimal policy response is to reduce marginal income taxes on low to middle incomes, while raising those on middle to high incomes. The reform favors those in the middle of the income distribution, reducing their average taxes while lowering transfers to those at the bottom.