How to Control Controlled School Choice

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Echenique, Federico; Yenmez, M. Bumin
• 署名单位: California Institute of Technology; Carnegie Mellon University
• 刊物名称: AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0002-8282
• DOI: 10.1257/aer.20130929
• 发表日期: 2015
• 页码: 2679-2694
• 关键词: coalition-formation; affirmative-action; preference; admissions; STABILITY

摘要

We characterize choice rules for schools that regard students as substitutes while expressing preferences for a diverse student body. The stable (or fair) assignment of students to schools requires the latter to regard the former as substitutes. Such a requirement is in conflict with the reality of schools' preferences for diversity. We show that the conflict can be useful, in the sense that certain unique rules emerge from imposing both considerations. We also provide welfare comparisons for students when different choice rules are employed. (JEL D47, H75, I21, I28)