Back to Fundamentals: Equilibrium in Abstract Economies
成果类型：
Article
署名作者：
Richter, Michael; Rubinstein, Ariel
署名单位：
Yeshiva University; Tel Aviv University; New York University
刊物名称：
AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW
ISSN/ISSBN：
0002-8282
DOI：
10.1257/aer.20140270
发表日期：
2015
页码：
2570-2594
关键词：
摘要：
We propose a new abstract definition of equilibrium in the spirit of competitive equilibrium: a profile of alternatives and a public ordering (expressing prestige, price, or a social norm) such that each agent prefers his assigned alternative to all lower-ranked ones. The equilibrium operates in an abstract setting built upon a concept of convexity borrowed from convex geometry. We apply the concept to a variety of convex economies and relate it to Pareto optimality. The magic of linear equilibrium prices is put into perspective by establishing an analogy between linear functions in the standard convexity and primitive orderings in the abstract convexity. (JEL I11, I18, J44, K13)