Climate Clubs: Overcoming Free-riding in International Climate Policy

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Nordhaus, William
• 署名单位: Yale University
• 刊物名称: AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0002-8282
• DOI: 10.1257/aer.15000001
• 发表日期: 2015
• 页码: 1339-1370
• 关键词: MEMBERSHIP RULES; economic-theory; STABILITY; MODEL

摘要

Notwithstanding great progress in scientific and economic understanding of climate change, it has proven difficult to forge international agreements because of free-riding, as seen in the defunct Kyoto Protocol. This study examines the club as a model for international climate policy. Based on economic theory and empirical modeling, it finds that without sanctions against non-participants there are no stable coalitions other than those with minimal abatement. By contrast, a regime with small trade penalties on non-participants, a Climate Club, can induce a large stable coalition with high levels of abatement.