Non-Optimal Mechanism Design

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Hartline, Jason D.; Lucier, Brendan
• 署名单位: Northwestern University; Microsoft
• 刊物名称: AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0002-8282
• DOI: 10.1257/aer.20130712
• 发表日期: 2015
• 页码: 3102-3124
• 关键词: Incentives; auctions

摘要

The optimal allocation of resources in complex environments-like allocation of dynamic wireless spectrum, cloud computing services, and Internet advertising-is computationally challenging even given the true preferences of the participants. In the theory and practice of optimization in complex environments, a wide variety of special and general purpose algorithms have been developed; these algorithms produce outcomes that are satisfactory but not generally optimal or incentive compatible. This paper develops a very simple approach for converting any, potentially non-optimal, algorithm for optimization given the true participant preferences, into a Bayesian incentive compatible mechanism that weakly improves social welfare and revenue.