Exclusive Contracts and Market Dominance

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Calzolari, Giacomo; Denicolo, Vincenzo
• 署名单位: University of Bologna; Center for Economic & Policy Research (CEPR); University of Leicester; University of Bologna
• 刊物名称: AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0002-8282
• DOI: 10.1257/aer.20131664
• 发表日期: 2015
• 页码: 3321-3351
• 关键词: naked exclusion; buyers compete; entry; foreclosure; discounts; breach; INTEL

摘要

We propose a new theory of exclusive dealing. The theory is based on the assumption that a dominant firm has a competitive advantage over its rivals, and that the buyers' willingness to pay for the product is private information. In this setting, the dominant firm can impose contractual restrictions on buyers without necessarily compensating them, implying that exclusive dealing contracts can be both profitable and anticompetitive. We discuss the general implications of the theory for competition policy and illustrate by examples its applicability to antitrust cases.