On Discrimination in Auctions with Endogenous Entry

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Jehiel, Philippe; Lamy, Laurent
• 署名单位: University of London; University College London
• 刊物名称: AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0002-8282
• DOI: 10.1257/aer.20131580
• 发表日期: 2015
• 页码: 2595-2643
• 关键词: 1st-price auctions; Government procurement; equilibrium selection; affirmative-action; DESIGN; COMPETITION; extraction; surplus; sellers

摘要

When entry is exogenous, strong buyers should be discriminated against weak buyers to maximize revenues (Myerson 1981). When entry is endogenous so that entrants' expected payoffs do not depend on the proposed mechanism, optimal discrimination takes a completely different form. The revenue-maximizing equilibrium requires that there should be no discrimination with respect to entrants irrespective of their ex ante characteristics. Besides, those buyers who always participate should be discriminated against entrants independently of their strength. These predictions are independent of the equilibrium selection when the number of potential entrants grows large. The optimality of first-price auctions is also discussed. (JEL D44, H57)