Evaluating Behaviorally Motivated Policy: Experimental Evidence from the Lightbulb Market

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Allcott, Hunt; Taubinsky, Dmitry
• 署名单位: New York University; National Bureau of Economic Research; Harvard University; University of California System; University of California Berkeley
• 刊物名称: AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0002-8282
• DOI: 10.1257/aer.20131564
• 发表日期: 2015
• 页码: 2501-2538
• 关键词: natural-gas; energy; CHOICE; externalities; investments; consumption; EFFICIENCY; barriers; COSTS; MODEL

摘要

Imperfect information and inattention to energy costs are important potential motivations for energy efficiency standards and subsidies. We evaluate these motivations in the lightbulb market using a theoretical model and two randomized experiments. We derive welfare effects as functions of reduced-form sufficient statistics capturing economic and psychological parameters, which we estimate using a novel within-subject information disclosure experiment. The main results suggest that moderate subsidies for energy-efficient lightbulbs may increase welfare, but informational and attentional biases alone do not justify a ban on incandescent lightbulbs. Our results and techniques generate broader methodological insights into welfare analysis with misoptimizing consumers. (JEL D12, D83, H21, H31, L67, Q41, Q48)