Intertemporal Price Discrimination: Dynamic Arrivals and Changing Values

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Garrett, Daniel F.
• 署名单位: Universite de Toulouse; Universite Toulouse 1 Capitole; Toulouse School of Economics
• 刊物名称: AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0002-8282
• DOI: 10.1257/aer.20130564
• 发表日期: 2016
• 页码: 3275-3299
• 关键词: DURABLE-GOODS MONOPOLY; mechanism design; demand; sales; consumers; models

摘要

We study the profit-maximizing price path of a monopolist selling a durable good to buyers who arrive over time and whose values for the good evolve stochastically. The setting is completely stationary with an infinite horizon. Contrary to the case with constant values, optimal prices fluctuate with time. We argue that consumers' randomly changing values offer an explanation for temporary price reductions that are often observed in practice.