Group Strategy-Proofness in Private Good Economies

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Barbera, Salvador; Berga, Dolors; Moreno, Bernardo
• 署名单位: Autonomous University of Barcelona; Barcelona School of Economics; Universitat de Girona
• 刊物名称: AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0002-8282
• DOI: 10.1257/aer.20141727
• 发表日期: 2016
• 页码: 1073-1099
• 关键词: Incentive compatibility; HIERARCHICAL EXCHANGE; Single-peakedness; COUNTER-THREATS; voting schemes; allocation; mechanisms; manipulation; auctions; assignment

摘要

Many salient rules to allocate private goods are not only strategy-proof, but also group strategy-proof, in appropriate domains of definition, hence diminishing the traditional conflict between incentives and efficiency. That is so for solutions to matching, division, cost sharing, house allocation, and auctions, in spite of the substantive disparity between these cases. In a general framework encompassing all of them, we prove that the equivalence between the two forms of strategy-proofness is due to an underlying common structure that transcends the many differences between the contexts and the mechanisms for which it holds.