Dynamic Procurement under Uncertainty: Optimal Design and Implications for Incomplete Contracts

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Arve, Malin; Martimort, David
• 署名单位: Norwegian School of Economics (NHH); Paris School of Economics
• 刊物名称: AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0002-8282
• DOI: 10.1257/aer.20150275
• 发表日期: 2016
• 页码: 3238-3274
• 关键词: public-private partnerships; mechanism design; moral hazard; asymmetric information; AGENCY RELATIONSHIPS; LATIN-AMERICA; RISK; auctions; COSTS; RENEGOTIATION

摘要

We characterize the optimal dynamic contract for a long-term basic service when an uncertain add-on is required later on. Introducing firm risk aversion has two impacts. Profits for the basic service can be backloaded to induce cheaper information revelation for this service: an Income Effect which reduces output distortions. The firm must also bear some risk to induce information revelation for the add-on. This Risk Effect reduces the level of the add-on but hardens information revelation for the basic service. The interaction between these effects has important implications for the dynamics of distortions, contract renegotiation, and the value of incomplete contracts.