Persuading Voters

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Alonso, Ricardo; Camara, Odilon
• 署名单位: University of London; London School Economics & Political Science; Center for Economic & Policy Research (CEPR); University of Southern California
• 刊物名称: AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0002-8282
• DOI: 10.1257/aer.20140737
• 发表日期: 2016
• 页码: 3590-3605
• 关键词: Bayesian persuasion; INFORMATION; disclosure

摘要

In a symmetric information voting model, an individual (politician) can influence voters' choices by strategically designing a policy experiment (public signal). We characterize the politician's optimal experiment. With a nonunanimous voting rule, she exploits voters' heterogeneity by designing an experiment with realizations targeting different winning coalitions. Consequently, under a simple-majority rule, a majority of voters might be strictly worse off due to the politician's influence. We characterize voters' preferences over electoral rules and provide conditions for a majority of voters to prefer a supermajority (or unanimity) voting rule, in order to induce the politician to supply a more informative experiment.