Medicaid Insurance in Old Age

成果类型:
Article
署名作者:
De Nardi, Mariacristina; French, Eric; Jones, John Bailey
署名单位:
University of London; University College London; Federal Reserve System - USA; Federal Reserve Bank - Chicago; National Bureau of Economic Research; Centre for Economic Policy Research - UK; State University of New York (SUNY) System; University at Albany, SUNY
刊物名称:
AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW
ISSN/ISSBN:
0002-8282
DOI:
10.1257/aer.20140015
发表日期:
2016
页码:
3480-3520
关键词:
term-care insurance Life-cycle model health-insurance bequest motives moral hazard demand expenses retirement mortality selection
摘要:
The old age provisions of the Medicaid program were designed to insure retirees against medical expenses. We estimate a structural model of savings and medical spending and use it to compute the distribution of lifetime Medicaid transfers and Medicaid valuations across currently single retirees. Compensating variation calculations indicate that current retirees value Medicaid insurance at more than its actuarial cost, but that most would value an expansion of the current Medicaid program at less than its cost. These findings suggest that for current single retirees, the Medicaid program may be of the approximately right size.