On Communication and Collusion

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Awaya, Yu; Krishna, Vijay
• 署名单位: University of Rochester; Pennsylvania Commonwealth System of Higher Education (PCSHE); Pennsylvania State University; Pennsylvania State University - University Park
• 刊物名称: AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0002-8282
• DOI: 10.1257/aer.20141469
• 发表日期: 2016
• 页码: 285-315
• 关键词: CORRELATED PRIVATE SIGNALS; repeated games; folk theorem; INFORMATION; oligopoly; EFFICIENCY

摘要

We study the role of communication within a cartel. Our analysis is carried out in Stigler's (1964) model of repeated oligopoly with secret price cuts. Firms observe neither the prices nor the sales of their rivals. For a fixed discount factor, we identify conditions under which there are equilibria with cheap talk that result in near-perfect collusion, whereas all equilibria without such communication are bounded away from this outcome. In our model, communication improves monitoring and leads to higher prices and profits.