Efficient Bailouts?

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Bianchi, Javier
• 刊物名称: AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0002-8282
• DOI: 10.1257/aer.20121524
• 发表日期: 2016
• 页码: 3607-3659
• 关键词: business-cycle; financial fragility; real wages; POLICY; liquidity; crises; guarantees; Dividends; PRIVATE; shocks

摘要

We develop a quantitative equilibrium model of financial crises to assess the interaction between ex post interventions in credit markets and the buildup of risk ex ante. During a systemic crisis, bailouts relax balance sheet constraints and mitigate the severity of the recession. Ex ante, the anticipation of such bailouts leads to an increase in risk-taking, making the economy more vulnerable to a financial crisis. We find that moral hazard effects are limited if bailouts are systemic and broad-based. If bailouts are idiosyncratic and targeted, however, this makes the economy significantly more exposed to financial crises.