Managerial Attention and Worker Performance

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Halac, Marina; Prat, Andrea
• 署名单位: Columbia University; University of Warwick; Columbia University; Columbia University
• 刊物名称: AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0002-8282
• DOI: 10.1257/aer.20140772
• 发表日期: 2016
• 页码: 3104-3132
• 关键词: Relational contracts; satisfaction; reputation; ECONOMICS; DYNAMICS; strategy

摘要

We present a novel theory of the employment relationship. A manager can invest in attention technology to recognize good worker performance. The technology may break and is costly to replace. We show that as time passes without recognition, the worker's belief about the manager's technology worsens and his effort declines. The manager responds by investing, but this investment is insufficient to stop the decline in effort and eventually becomes decreasing. The relationship therefore continues deteriorating, and a return to high performance becomes increasingly unlikely. These deteriorating dynamics do not arise when recognition is of bad performance or independent of effort.