Taxing Top CEO Incomes

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Ales, Laurence; Sleet, Christopher
• 署名单位: Carnegie Mellon University
• 刊物名称: AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0002-8282
• DOI: 10.1257/aer.20151093
• 发表日期: 2016
• 页码: 3331-3366
• 关键词: Optimal taxation; taxable income; labor-market; COMPENSATION; elasticities; selection; rates; MODEL; pay

摘要

We use a firm-CEO assignment framework to model the market for CEO effective labor. In the model's equilibrium, more talented CEOs match with and supply more effort to larger firms. Taxation of CEO incomes affects the equilibrium pricing of CEO effective labor and, hence, spills over and affects firm profits. Absent the ability to tax profits or a direct concern for firm owners, a standard prescription for high marginal income taxes emerges. However, given such an ability or concern, the optimal marginal tax rates are much lower.