Evolving Choice Inconsistencies in Choice of Prescription Drug Insurance

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Abaluck, Jason; Gruber, Jonathan
• 署名单位: National Bureau of Economic Research; Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT)
• 刊物名称: AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0002-8282
• DOI: 10.1257/aer.20130778
• 发表日期: 2016
• 页码: 2145-2184
• 关键词: MEDICARE PART-D; selection; inertia

摘要

We study choice over prescription insurance plans by the elderly using government administrative data to evaluate how these choices evolve over time. We find large foregone savings from not choosing the lowest cost plan that has grown over time. We develop a structural framework to decompose the changes in foregone welfare from inconsistent choices into choice set changes and choice function changes from a fixed choice set. We find that foregone welfare increases over time due primarily to changes in plan characteristics such as premiums and out-of-pocket costs; we estimate little learning at either the individual or cohort level.