Moderating Political Extremism: Single Round versus Runoff Elections under Plurality Rule

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Bordignon, Massimo; Nannicini, Tommaso; Tabellini, Guido
• 署名单位: Catholic University of the Sacred Heart; Leibniz Association; Ifo Institut; Bocconi University; Centre for Economic Policy Research - UK; IZA Institute Labor Economics; University of London; London School Economics & Political Science; Centre for Economic Policy Research - UK
• 刊物名称: AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0002-8282
• DOI: 10.1257/aer.20131024
• 发表日期: 2016
• 页码: 2349-2370
• 关键词: regression-discontinuity design; DUVERGERS HYPOTHESIS; COMPETITION; candidates; systems; LAW

摘要

We compare single round versus runoff elections under plurality rule, allowing for partly endogenous party formation. Under runoff elections, the number of political candidates is larger, but the influence of extremist voters on equilibrium policy, and hence policy volatility, is smaller because the bargaining power of the political extremes is reduced compared to single round elections. The predictions on the number of candidates and on policy volatility are confirmed by evidence from a regression discontinuity design in Italy, where cities above 15,000 inhabitants elect the mayor with a runoff system, while those below hold single round elections.