Properties of the Combinatorial Clock Auction

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Levin, Jonathan; Skrzypacz, Andrzej
• 署名单位: Stanford University; Stanford University
• 刊物名称: AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0002-8282
• DOI: 10.1257/aer.20141212
• 发表日期: 2016
• 页码: 2528-2551
• 关键词: SELECTING PACKAGE AUCTIONS; demand reduction; COMPETITION

摘要

The combinatorial clock auction has become popular for large-scale spectrum awards and other uses, replacing more traditional ascending or clock auctions. We describe some surprising properties of the auction, including a wide range of ex post equilibria with demand expansion, demand reduction, and predation. Our results obtain in a standard homogeneous good setting where bidders have well-behaved linear demand curves, and suggest some practical difficulties with dynamic implementations of the Vickrey auction.