Timing Decisions in Organizations: Communication and Authority in a Dynamic Environment

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Grenadier, Steven R.; Malenko, Andrey; Malenko, Nadya
• 署名单位: Stanford University; Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT); Boston College
• 刊物名称: AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0002-8282
• DOI: 10.1257/aer.20150416
• 发表日期: 2016
• 页码: 2552-2581
• 关键词: strategic information-transmission; optimal delegation; cheap talk; INVESTMENT; experimentation; credibility

摘要

We consider a problem where an uninformed principal makes a timing decision interacting with an informed but biased agent. Because time is irreversible, the direction of the bias crucially affects the agent's ability to credibly communicate information. When the agent favors late decision making, full information revelation often occurs. In this case, centralized decision making, where the principal retains authority and communicates with the agent, implements the optimal decision-making rule. When the agent favors early decision making, communication is partial, and the optimal decision-making rule is not implemented. Delegation adds value when the bias is for early decision making, but not for late decision making.