The Evolution of Strategic Sophistication

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Robalino, Nikolaus; Robson, Arthur
• 署名单位: Rochester Institute of Technology; Simon Fraser University
• 刊物名称: AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0002-8282
• DOI: 10.1257/aer.20140105
• 发表日期: 2016
• 页码: 1046-1072
• 关键词: BAYESIAN PLAYERS; games; mind; equilibrium; thinking

摘要

This paper investigates the evolutionary foundation for our ability to attribute preferences to others, an ability that is central to conventional game theory. We argue here that learning others' preferences allows individuals to efficiently modify their behavior in strategic environments with a persistent element of novelty. Agents with the ability to learn have a sharp, unambiguous advantage over those who are less sophisticated because the former agents extrapolate to novel circumstances information about opponents' preferences that was learned previously. This advantage holds even with a suitably small cost to reflect the additional cognitive complexity involved.