Team Incentives and Performance: Evidence from a Retail Chain

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Friebel, Guido; Heinz, Matthias; Krueger, Miriam; Zubanov, Nikolay
• 署名单位: Goethe University Frankfurt; Centre for Economic Policy Research - UK; IZA Institute Labor Economics; University of Cologne; Deutsche Bundesbank; University of Konstanz
• 刊物名称: AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0002-8282
• DOI: 10.1257/aer.20160788
• 发表日期: 2017
• 页码: 2168-2203
• 关键词: human-resource management; field experiments; Peer pressure; FIRM LEVEL; PRODUCTIVITY; pay; countries; WORKER; CONTRACTS; WORKPLACE

摘要

In a field experiment with a retail chain (1,300 employees, 193 shops), randomly selected sales teams received a bonus. The bonus increases both sales and number of customers dealt with by 3 percent. Each dollar spent on the bonus generates $3.80 in sales, and $2.10 in profit. Wages increase by 2.2 percent while inequality rises only moderately. The analysis suggests effort complementarities to be important, and the effectiveness of peer pressure in overcoming free-riding to be limited. After rolling out the bonus scheme, the performance of the treatment and control shops converges, suggesting long-term stability of the treatment effect. (JEL D22, J31, J33, L25, L81, M53, M54)