Recall and Unemployment

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Fujita, Shigeru; Moscarini, Giuseppe
• 署名单位: Federal Reserve System - USA; Federal Reserve Bank - Philadelphia; Yale University; Yale University; National Bureau of Economic Research
• 刊物名称: AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0002-8282
• DOI: 10.1257/aer.20131496
• 发表日期: 2017
• 页码: 3875-3916
• 关键词: equilibrium unemployment; cyclical behavior; job search; expectations; VACANCIES; MODEL

摘要

We document in the Survey of Income and Program Participation covering the period 1990-2013 that a surprisingly large share of workers return to their previous employer after a jobless spell, and experience very different unemployment and employment outcomes than job switchers. The probability of recall is much less procyclical and volatile than the probability of finding a new employer. We add to a quantitative, and otherwise canonical, search-and-matching model of the labor market a recall option, which can be activated freely following aggregate and job-specific productivity shocks. Recall and search effort significantly amplify the cyclical volatility of new job-finding and separation probabilities.