Buyer-Optimal Learning and Monopoly Pricing

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Roesler, Anne-Katrin; Szentes, Balazs
• 署名单位: University of Michigan System; University of Michigan; University of London; London School Economics & Political Science
• 刊物名称: AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0002-8282
• DOI: 10.1257/aer.20160145
• 发表日期: 2017
• 页码: 2072-2080
• 关键词: information acquisition; Optimal auctions; IGNORANCE

摘要

This paper analyzes a bilateral trade model where the buyer's valuation for the object is uncertain and she observes only a signal about her valuation. The seller gives a take-it-or-leave-it offer to the buyer. Our goal is to characterize those signal structures which maximize the buyer's expected payoff. We identify a buyer-optimal signal structure which generates (i) efficient trade and (ii) a unit-elastic demand. Furthermore, we show that every other buyer-optimal signal structure yields the same outcome as the one we identify: in particular, the same price.