Equilibria in networks

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Hendricks, K; Piccione, M; Tan, GF
• 署名单位: University of British Columbia; University of Southampton; Hong Kong University of Science & Technology
• 刊物名称: ECONOMETRICA
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0012-9682
• DOI: 10.1111/1468-0262.00084
• 发表日期: 1999
• 页码: 1407-1434
• 关键词: AIRLINE; COMPETITION; economies; dominance; density; mergers; entry; MODEL; HUBS

摘要

We study a model in which two carriers choose networks to connect cities and compete for customers. We show that if carriers compete aggressively (e.g., Bertrand-like behavior), one carrier operating a single hub-spoke network is an equilibrium outcome. Competing hub-spoke networks are not an equilibrium outcome, although duopoly equilibria in nonhub networks can exist. If carriers do not compete aggressively, an equilibrium with competing hub-spoke networks exists as long as the number of cities is not too small. We provide conditions under which all equilibria consist of hub-spoke networks.