Price Cutting and Business Stealing in Imperfect Cartels

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Bernheim, B. Douglas; Madsen, Erik
• 署名单位: Stanford University; National Bureau of Economic Research; New York University
• 刊物名称: AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0002-8282
• DOI: 10.1257/aer.20140359
• 发表日期: 2017
• 页码: 387-424
• 关键词: Repeated games; collusion; opec; COMMUNICATION; entry; equilibrium; INFORMATION; auctions; BEHAVIOR; tests

摘要

Although economists have made substantial progress toward formulating theories of collusion in industrial cartels that account for a variety of fact patterns, important puzzles remain. Standard models of repeated interaction formalize the observation that cartels keep participants in line through the threat of punishment, but they fail to explain two important factual observations: first, apparently deliberate cheating actually occurs; second, it frequently goes unpunished even when it is detected. We propose a theory of equilibrium price cutting and business stealing in cartels to bridge this gap between theory and observation.